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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10. 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal 
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to the 
proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
(1) the value of the property sought 
to be condemned and all improvements 
thereupon appertaining to the realty, 
and each and every separate estate or 
interest therein; and if it consists of 
different parcels, the value of each 
parcel and of each estate or interest 
therein shall be separately assessed. 
(2) if the property sought to be 
condemned constitutes only a part of 
a larger parcel, the damages which will 
accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned 
and the construction of the improvement 
in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a* This is a condemnation case filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. The Plaintiff 
acquired by this action property from the Defendant for the 
construction of an interstate highway project in Salt Lake County. 
b. The case was tried to a jury with the Honorable Pat 
B. Brian presiding. After a verdict was rendered by the jury the 
Defendant filed a Motion for Additur or in the Alternative for a 
New Trial. 
vi 
c. The trial court denied the Defendant's Motion for 
Additur or in the Alternative a New Trial. The Defendant filed its 
Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court and it was transferred 
to the Utah Court of Appeals for decision. 
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ISSUES (.U I / kPPKAL 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS RULINGS 
REGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF ONE OF UDOT'S 
EXPERT WITNESSES REGARDING A CONVERSATION 
WITH THE OWNER RELATIVE TO A NEGOTIATED 
OFFER• 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING AN 
EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY REGARDING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTIES SIMILAR TO THE 
SUBJECT. 
lxl^ D I D T H E T R I A L C 0 U R T E R R I N I T S RULINGS 
REGARDING THE USE OF HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS 
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
IV. WAS THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL IN CONFORMITY 
WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON UDOT'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 vocation of Subject and Highway Project History, 
the instan action acquired from the Appellant 
Associates (the Owner hree parcels of :=md fox Uie construcLxon 
of, an Interchange on I Jib in the southeast part of the Salt Lake 
Valley and the relocation of a roadway feeding into the interchange 
(extension ot 6200 South) . • Attached tci • * f 
Complaint a map depicting these parcels which identifies them by 
number and shows their location |K ]2,| Parcel 207B:A (i , 624 
acres) was acquired for the construct ion nf tin-" iiril; ei/rvhanqe a iici 
Parcels 207B I 095 acres net) and 207B:2A (.012 acres net) were for 
the relocation of Big Cottonwood Canyon Road (the extension of 6200 
South), in i-. 'i, i  | hit- in "qui nit i (uiFi weu- f i mil ui iiaiiiej (jaief1.) 
which contained approximately 21.23 acres. 
The design for the 1-215 freeway was begun iii the early 
i 
1960's. [R. 84.] The interchange which was originally designed 
for this location was a diamond configuration. The location of 
this interchange was approximately 6200 South and just east of 
Holladay Boulevard in the southeast area of Salt Lake County, an 
area commonly known as the Holladay/Cottonwood area. The 
intersection of Holladay Boulevard and 6200 South is referred to as 
Knudsen's Corner. 
In 1963 DDOT initiated a condemnation action to acquire 
property from the Owner's predecessor in interest, Bettilyon, for 
the construction of 1-215, including the designed diamond 
interchange. [R. 195.] This case is referred to as 
Bettilyon I by the trial court. [R. 195.] A second action was 
brought to acquire additional property for modifications to the 
diamond interchange in 1973. [R. 198.] This case is referred to by 
the trial court as Bettilyon II. At the time the diamond 
interchange was designed there was no design for continuing 6200 
South (Cottonwood Canyon Road) past the interchange from the west 
to the east. The relocation of Cottonwood Canyon Road was part of 
the interchange design within the interchange itself. [UDOT's Ex. 
P-l, Owner's Ex. D-A. Addendum Attachments 2 and 1.] [R. 198.] In 
1986 DDOT received approval to revise the interchange design from 
a diamond configuration to an urban design. [R. 85.] The design 
change was based in part on revisions in traffic volume 
projections, and the diamond design had serious capacity and safety 
deficiencies for the projected volumes. [R. 85.] The urban 
interchange design allowed for smoother, more free traffic flow. 
[R. 85, Tr. 88, Tr. 589] The instant action was brought to acquire 
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the property needed for the urban interchange design. In addition 
to the acquisition for the urban interchange, the acquisition of 
two parcels was for the construction of a connecting road running 
easterly from the interchange to Wasatch Boulevard. [UDOT's Ex. 
P-2 Addendum Attachment 3.] [Tr. 112.] 
Attached hereto are three exhibits depicting the subject 
property. Attachment 1 is a copy of Defendants Exhibit D-A which 
shows the subject property in the before condition with the diamond 
interchange design and the relocated Cottonwood Canyon Road. 
Attachment 2 is a copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit P-1 which is an 
aerial photograph of the subject property with the existing road 
system and the design of the diamond interchange imposed over the 
photograph with various colors representing different aspects of 
that design. Attachment 3 is a copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit P-2 
which is an aerial photograph of the subject property after the 
construction of the urban interchange. In Attachments 2 and 3 the 
subject property is outlined in red. 
The design of the urban interchange and the connecting 
road provided the basis for determining the value of the subject 
property after the taking. UDOT filed a Motion in Limine for a 
determination from the court as to the conditions to be assumed in 
determining the value of the property before the taking. The trial 
court ruled that in determining the value of the property 
before the taking, the impact of the diamond interchange as 
designed at the time of the filing of the Bettilyon II (1973) case 
would be considered. [R. 193-206.] The court ruled that UDOT's 
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design for 1-215 and the diamond interchange at that time was 
final, that the design changes (for the urban interchange and the 
extension of 6200 South) were not even remotely contemplated and 
the Owner should have been able to rely on the finality of the 
diamond design after 1973. [R. 199, 200, 205.] 
The diamond interchange design included the relocation of 
Cottonwood Canyon Road (6200 South extension east of Holladay 
Boulevard) as required for the interchange construction. This 
relocation was under the interchange and connected with the 
existing road system (existing Cottonwood Canyon Road before it 
reached the Owner's frontage on that road). [Ex. D-A and Ex. P-l# 
Attachments 1 and 2.] The Owner's contention that 6200 South 
Cottonwood Canyon Road (6200 South) was to be somehow extended or 
otherwise improved as part of the diamond interchange design is in 
error. 
Contrary to the contention of the Owner, all of UDOT's 
witnesses considered the effect of the diamond inteFchange design 
on the subject property in its condition before the taking in their 
testimony. [Beaufort Tr. 574-588.] [VanDrimmelen Tr. 636-639.] 
[dinger Tr. 787-788.] The after condition was based on the design 
of the urban interchange (as constructed) and the 6200 South 
connector road. [R. 12, Ex. P-2, Attachment 3.] 
2. Highest and Best Use of the Subject Property. 
There was a divergence of opinion between the expert 
witnesses who testified for UDOT and those who appeared for the 
Owner as to the highest and best use of the subject property both 
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in the before and after conditions. UDOT's witnesses testified 
that the highest and best use both before and after the taking was 
for low density professional and business office. [Tr. 646-654, 
789-794 before. 1 [Tr. 676-682, 804-805 after. 1 Witnesses for the 
Owner testified that the highest and best use of the subject before 
the taking was for office or business use with some mixed-in 
commercial uses. [Tr. 265, 447.] It is somewhat difficult to 
determine what the opinions of the Owner's witnesses were regarding 
the highest and best use of the subject property after the taking. 
Mr. Brown, one of the Owner's appraisal witnesses, said in answer 
to a question from its counsel regarding the after highest and best 
use, that it no longer had "any commercial development potential." 
[Tr. 472.] In an attempt to have him clarify his answer, Owner's 
counsel asked him the following question: 
Q. By commercial development potential, do 
you mean business, as well ... business 
orientation ... when you say commercial, 
you mean retail as well as office space, 
do you? 
A. Yes, sir, I do. 
[Tr. 472.] 
Later, counsel for the Owner asked Mr. Brown again to 
give his opinion of the highest and best use after the taking. Mr. 
Brown's response was: 
A. That's questionable, Mr. Campbell. I have 
attempted to determine the highest and best 
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use, but it is now a secondary type of 
property in the market. 
[Tr. 476.] 
The other appraisal witness for the Owner, Mr. Cook, 
testified that the highest and best use after the taking was 
"somewhat cloudy" but still had some "hampered" "business park type 
uses." [Tr. 289.] 
3. Development Potential After the Taking. 
The position taken by the Owner regarding development of 
the subject property after the taking was: 
Because access was only available 
from the east AFTER the taking, planning 
principles, regulations and guidelines 
would not permit the type of access 
that would enable reasonable business 
or residential development on the 
subject property. 
The Owner's Brief P. 7. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The Owner's witness, Mr. DeMass who testified regarding 
engineering issues for the Owner, stated: 
A. As far as developable access, when 
you travel the freeway or any road, you 
want to turn off and get to wherever you 
are going in the quickest, most expeditious 
way. ... So, as far as developable access, 
very questionable. I say there isn't any. 
[Tr. P. 86, 87.] [Emphasis added.] 
The Owner's witness Mr. Brown, testified in this regard: 
A. Mr. Campbell, 30th East is a mere 
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back-door access into this subject 
property. There would be access to it 
but it would not be a developable access. 
[Tr. 467.] [Emphasis added.] 
••• all of the developable access to the 
subject property had been acquired bv the 
government in the action. . . . 
It is now a piece of property that no 
longer has any commercial development 
potential. 
[Tr. 471, 472.] [Emphasis added.] 
It no longer has the viability of 
development that it enjoyed in the before 
condition. 
[Tr. 477.] 
UDOT's witnesses testified that the subject property 
could be developed in the after condition with the access control 
along the newly aligned Cottonwood Canyon Road (6200 South) for the 
same uses as in the before condition. [Tr. 806-808.] The access 
remaining after the taking consisted of approximately 650 feet of 
uncontrolled frontage on 3000 East. [Tr. 810.] All of UDOT's 
witnesses testified that this was ample for development purposes. 
[Tr. 808.] 
In support of that conclusion, Mr. dinger, one of the 
DDOT's appraisal witnesses, referred to comparable sales of 
properties that had been developed for business and commercial uses 
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near interchanges having access restrictions similar to the subject 
in the after condition. [Tr. 820-821.] He also testified that the 
comparable sales he used in determining the before value would be 
equally applicable in determining after value. The accessibility 
conditions of the subject and the comparables were similar. [Tr. 
866.] 
In addition Mr. dinger testified regarding several 
properties with access control conditions and locations similar to 
those of the subject in the after condition that had been developed 
for business office and commercial uses to support his conclusion 
that the subject property was developable in its after condition 
for those uses. [Tr. 810-821.] [UDOT's Exhibits 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 
and 24.] This evidence was in stark contrast to that offered by 
the Owner that the remaining property was not developable in its 
after condition for those uses. 
4. VanDrimmelenfs Testimony Regarding an Offer to 
Purchase. 
As indicated above, the position of the Owner was that 
the subject had commercial potential before the taking that was 
eliminated in its after condition by UDOT's taking and 
construction. Mr. VanDrimmelen, one of UDOT's appraisal witnesses 
testified that, in his judgment, if the property could have been 
developed in the before condition for commercial uses it could be 
developed in the after condition. He gave as support for this 
conclusion (1) that there were many commercial developments near 
interchanges that were not accessible "just off the interchange" 
and (2) that interest in the subject property for commercial 
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development had been reported to him by the Owner through one of 
its partners, Mr. Jacobsen. Mr. Jacobsen stated there was such 
interest with or without access to 6200 South expressed by an oil 
company for a possible convenience store site. [Tr.685.] Counsel 
for the Owner objected to this testimony and the court struck the 
testimony as it "related to a negotiated offer." [Tr. 685, 686.] 
The Owner's Counsel subsequently sought a further ruling on the 
matter and the court struck all references to the values mentioned 
in the offer. [Tr. 694-700.] The statement by Mr. Jacobson, 
regarding an offer for commercial development of the subject 
property after the taking was inconsistent with the testimony the 
Owner submitted at trial that the property was not developable for 
those uses. 
5. Hypothetical Questions on Cross-Examination. 
The Owner claims it was somehow prejudiced by not being 
allowed to ask UDOT's witnesses hypothetical questions relating to 
the subject property. The questions posed changed the facts of the 
case and did not represent either the condition of the subject 
property in its before or after condition. Counsel asked the 
witness to assume that the north portion of the subject property 
sold before the taking from the south. The question not only 
assumed facts not in evidence but was contrary to the facts of the 
case. It served no useful purpose to allow such questions and 
would have been confusing to the jury. The Owner's counsel was 
allowed to ask related questions, including some hypothetical 
questions, to obtain the information he sought. [Tr. 721, 723, 
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761, 762.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The issues raised by the Owner by this appeal are all 
based on either misconceptions of the facts, and/or the law as 
applied to the facts or flagrant mischaracterization of the 
evidence. This case was fairly tried to a jury with both UDOT and 
the Owner given an opportunity to submit their respective positions 
to the jury for a decision. 
1. The Owner misconstrued the "offer" testimony of 
UDOT's witness both factually and as the law applies to the actual 
facts. The "offer" was referred to by UDOT's witness, 
VanDrimmelen, not as a comparable sale in support of his value 
conclusion. It was submitted in response to the Owner's claim that 
the subject property could not be developed for commercial purposes 
after the taking by UDOT. The "offer" went to the issue of 
indicating an interest in the property by a commercial developer 
after the taking. Offers that indicate a demand for the property 
for particular use are, under the law, admissible. 
The "offer" came to VanDrimmelen in an extrajudicial 
statement by the Owner that indicated an interest in the property 
after the taking for commercial development which was inconsistent 
with the evidence it presented at trial. This statement was 
admissible as an admission against interest. 
The only reason the testimony on this point survived at 
trial was because Owner's counsel revived the issue after the court 
struck the "offer" reference from the record. The issue become 
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moot at this point. 
2. UDOT's witness, dinger, used examples of developed 
sites on or near interchanges that had access restrictions similar 
to those of the subject property in its after condition. Such 
testimony is admissible, 1) as rebuttal to the Owner's contention 
that such properties could not be developed, 2) as a part of the 
basis for his expert opinion regarding the accessibility of the 
subject property in its after condition for development purposes, 
3) under the law as a factor that should be considered by a real 
estate appraiser, and 4) as an accepted practice in the industry 
(acknowledged by Owner's witness Cook). 
3. The Owner was afforded the opportunity to cross 
examine UDOT witnesses in all areas including those where the court 
sustained objections regarding questions about the subject property 
that assumed facts contrary to the evidence. By asking other 
questions, even other hypothetical questions, the Owner was allowed 
to cover the subject matter it sought to explore by the 
objectionable hypothetical questions. 
Allowing hypothetical questions, which assume facts 
contrary to the evidence, in any event, is discretionary with the 
court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion on this issue. 
4. The Owner in its brief, grossly misstated UDOT's 
testimony by claiming that UDOT witnesses "subverted and violated 
what plainly had become the law of the case." (Owner's Brief P. 
35.) The Owner stated in its brief that UDOT's offered evidence 
was that the subject property in its before condition "did not 
IX 
benefit from the freeway interchange" under the diamond design. 
This statement is simply incorrect. Witness, VanDrimmelen, 
testified that the value without the diamond interchange influence 
would have been between $1.00 and $1.50 per square foot. With the 
benefit of the diamond interchange in the before condition, he 
testified it had a value of $3.20 per square foot, a benefit of 
considerably more than 100%. dinger, likewise, testified for UDOT 
that the before value of $3.80 per square foot with the diamond 
interchange was the same as the after value with the urban 
interchange. Clinger, testified that the subject property being on 
the diamond interchange was a "very good parcel of land, extremely 
well located and a good development parcel." [Tr. 790.] 
UDOT witnesses and witnesses for the Owner referred to 
Exhibits D-A and P-l (Attachments 1 and 2) which showed the 
condition of the subject property in the before condition. These 
Exhibits and the testimony of witnesses for UDOT and the Owner 
established that the "relocated Cottonwood Canyon Road" (6200 
South) was, under the diamond design, relocated only within the 
interchange area. It connected with the existing road system east 
of the interchange before it reached the frontage of the subject 
property. This testimony was in accord with the trial court's 
ruling on UDOT's Motion in Limine. 
5. There was no prejudicial error committed by the trial 
court and the jury verdict was well within the range of and 
supported by the evidence. This court should allow the jury 
verdict to stand. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellee, Utah Department of Transportation, seeks to 
have this court affirm the verdict of the jury entered after the 
trial of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS 
REGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS VANDRIMMELEN 
RELATIVE TO HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OWNER 
REGARDING A NEGOTIATED OFFER. 
1. The "Offer" Testimony was Stricken by the Trial 
Thus Mooting the Issue. 
The rhetoric and arguments of the Owner regarding the 
VanDrimmelen testimony are not only inappropriate but incorrect. 
The questions regarding that issue were mooted by the trial court 
in its ruling on the Owner's counsel's objection at trial. Counsel 
objected that the "witnesses' last statement that somebody was 
willing to offer something is clearly not evidence in this 
courtroom . . . I object to it." [Tr. 685.] The court ruling on 
the objection was as follows: 
THE COURT: The portion of the answer that related 
to a negotiated offer will be stricken from the 
record. [Tr. 685, 686.] 
The portion of the VanDrimmelen testimony that the Owner 
thought was objectionable was stricken. The only part remaining 
was his reference to other developments that existed having similar 
characteristics to the subject in its after condition. 
The Owner cannot complain where its objection has been 
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sustained> This principle was enunciated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court as follows: 
Error is urged in permitting certain 
witnesses to testify as to custom, 
although such evidence was afterward 
stricken. This court has heretofore 
announced the rule that an appellant 
cannot complaint of testimony stricken 
from the record as prejudicial. 
Baldwin v. Mittry, 102 P.2d 643, 646 (Idaho 
1940). [Emphasis added.] 
A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of 
Missouri in Pender v. Foeste. 329 S.W.2d 656# 662 (Mo. 1959). 
Later, counsel requested further argument on the issue 
and the court gave the jury this further instruction. 
THE COURT: There has been some testimony 
given by the witness now on the stand 
regarding statements made by a Mr. Jacobsen 
and confirmed by Chevron Oil, regarding the 
value of the questioned property per square 
foot. Specifically, there was a reference 
of $18 per square foot with access, $12 per 
square foot without access. Supposedly, that 
value was confirmed by a representative of 
Chevron Oil. Disregard the portion of the 
expert witnesses testimony that referred to 
that subject matter. [Tr. 701.3 
With the two instructions given by the court the "offer" 
testimony was stricken and the Owner's basis for complaint ended. 
2. The Testimony of VanDrimmelen Regarding the 
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Negotiated Offer was Admissible. 
Even if the VanDrimmelen testimony had survived it would 
not have been error to allow it. 
The Owner in this case, has misconstrued both the facts 
and the law regarding the testimony of Mr. VanDrimmelen. The 
challenged testimony was in response to a question relating to 
whether or not in his opinion the subject property would lose 
commercial potential, if it had any, because of the taking and 
access restrictions in its after condition. [Tr. 683.] This 
question is clearly appropriate since the Owner contended and 
through its witnesses testified that the taking virtually destroyed 
all potential commercial development. [Tr. 86, 87, 467, 472, 476, 
289.] 
In his response to this question Mr. VanDrimmelen 
testified that if the property had commercial potential in its 
before condition it had it in the after condition. He gave as his 
reasons (1) there had been numerous examples where properties 
similarly situated had developed which were not immediately 
accessible off the interchange and (2) there had been an interest 
in the subject property expressed by a commercial developer and 
that interest continued after the taking. [Tr. 684, 685.] In a 
conversation with Mr. Heber Jacobsen, a partner in the Owner's 
Company, Mr. VanDrimmelen was told of the interest to purchase for 
commercial purposes. [Tr. 685.] 
The testimony of Mr. VanDrimmelen regarding this offer 
was not included as part of his comparable sales testimony he used 
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in determining land value. He used ten (10) comparable land sales 
to support his conclusion of value of the subject property. [Tr. 
661 - 672.] These comparables were consummated sales between 
buyers and sellers. As indicated above the offer which Mr. 
Jacobson told Mr. VanDrimmelen about only went to the issue of use 
and that there was a developer who had expressed an interest in the 
property for a particular use. This testimony was not "illicit" 
without justification given the references by witnesses for the 
Owner to the effect that no one would want the subject property for 
commercial uses in the after condition. It was certainly 
appropriate to show the inconsistency of the Owner's position. 
There is support by way of precedent for the position 
that offers are not admissible as a basis for value finding. The 
cases cited by the Owner in its brief, are not contrary to UDOT's 
position. These cases indicate that "offers" should not be allowed 
as comparable sales to support value conclusions. DDOT did not 
present the testimony as a comparable sale. As "indicated the 
VanDrimmelen use of the offer was not in support of his value 
finding but in rebuttal to the Owner's claim regarding use. The 
major treatise on Eminent Domain in this country is Nichols on 
Eminent Domain. In this treatise it is stated that an offer is 
admissible for the purpose of showing interest in property for a 
particular use. Nichols states the proposition as follows: 
It has been held also that where 
the purpose of the introduction of 
offers to purchase is to show that there 
is a demand for such property for a 
special purpose, such evidence is ad-
missible only insofar as it will prove 
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that such offers were made. 
Vol. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 21.4 [1] P. 21-
123 (Revised 3rd Edition, 1991)• 
This position has been adopted by numerous courts in 
various jurisdictions throughout the United States. In the City of 
St. Louis v. Vasquez. 341 S.W. 2d 839# 848 (Mo. 1960) the court 
allowed this type of testimony to come in and in doing so stated: 
This testimony, indicating an active 
interest in the land in question on the 
part of prospective buyers, was relevant 
on the question of general desirability 
of and demand for this land. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held. 
Testimony that offers were made 
for property condemned is admissible 
to show that the same is desirable and 
marketable; however, testimony of the 
amount of an offer by one who did not 
make it would offend the 'Hearsay' rule. 
. . . 
Kelly v. Redevelopment Authority of Allegheny Co. 
180 A. 2d 39, 45 (Penn. 1962) 
In a case with a factual situation close to that in the 
instant case a witness was asked whether or not any major oil 
companies or motel businesses had approached the owner interested 
in acquiring the property which was the subject of the eminent 
domain action. In allowing the testimony that such interest in the 
property had been expressed the court held: 
Appellees respond that this evidence 
was introduced only for the purpose of 
showing that the property was suitable 
for business purposes and that there was 
a reasonable probability of that use in 
the near future. . . . It is our opinion 
that this evidence was properly submitted 
and did not fall into the category of 
offers which, of course, may not be shown. 
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Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Turner. 
497 S.W. 2d 57, 59 (Kan. 1973) 
As indicated the testimony offered by Mr. VanDrimmelen 
was for the purpose of responding to the Owner's claim that all 
potential commercial use for the property had been destroyed. It 
went to the use of the property in its after condition. Such 
testimony as indicated is admissible for that purpose. 
3. The Statements by the Owner Regarding the 
Offer Were Admissions Against Interest. 
There is another reason why the VanDrimmelen testimony 
should have been admissible. The testimony regarding the 
negotiations between the Owner and Chevron Oil was based on a 
conversation between the witness and Mr. Jacobsen, a partner in the 
Owner's Company. The Owner's position at the trial was that the 
property could not be developed commercially in its after 
condition. The testimony is admissible as an admission against 
interest. 
The Court of Appeals in Illinois admitted evidence of an 
offer to purchase and held that even if it would not have been 
admissible on other grounds it would have been admitted as an 
admission against interest. The Court stated: 
Assuming, arguendo, that defendants 
are correct in their previous contention, 
the offer to purchase is still admissible 
on other grounds. Illinois courts have held 
that declarations by an owner that his prop-
erty is worth less than what he contends at 
trial are admissible as admissions against 
interest. 
Lake County Forest Preserve Dist. v. O'Malley. 
421 N.E. 2d 980 (111. 1981) 
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The general principles regarding admissions against 
interest are set out in American Jurisprudence 2nd as follows: 
The admissions of a party made directly 
by him or through his agent duly authorized 
to speak for him, or by a privy, relative to 
the subject matter of a suit are admissible 
in evidence against such party where they are 
inconsistent with the claim he asserts in the 
action, whether he is the plaintiff or the 
defendant and whether or not he is available 
as a witness. 
29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 600 P. 655. 
In Korleski v. Needham. 222 N.E. 2d 334, 337 (111. 1966) 
the Illinois Court of Appeals stated the principle as 
follows: 
Any statement, oral or written, vol-
untarily made by a party to an action that 
contradicts the position taken by that party 
may be introduced into evidence as an admission 
against interest if it is pertinent to the 
issues of the case. Ic|. at 337. 
In the instant case, (1) the prior statements by Mr. 
Jacobsen were clearly in contradiction to the position the Owner 
took at trial and (2) the issue regarding developability of the 
subject after the taking was certainly "pertinent to the issues of 
the case." Admissions against interest have been allowed into 
evidence and sustained by the Utah Supreme Court. In Reid v. 
Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 P.2d 680 (1939) the Utah Supreme Court 
allowed comments made by a father about his son's careless driving 
to stand as an admission against interest. 
For the Owner to intimate that VanDrimmelen some how 
acted unethically by suggesting he knew the testimony he was 
offering was inadmissible is inexcusable. First, Mr. VanDrimmelen 
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is not a lawyer and not expected to know the rules of evidence but 
secondly, and more importantly, the offered testimony was not 
inadmissible according to substantial case and treatise authority. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING AN 
EXPERT APPRAISAL WITNESS FOR UDOT TO TESTIFY 
REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS AT INTERCHANGE SITES. 
1* The Testimony Regarding the Development of 
Similar Sites was Proper Rebuttal. 
As indicated earlier in this brief the Owner's witnesses 
testified repeatedly that the subject property, because of the 
access control, could not in the after condition be developed for 
commercial purposes. Its witnesses testimony was based on naked 
assertions without any support therefore. It is incomprehensible 
that the Owner would challenge UDOT's witnesses' response that the 
property could be developed and as support for that opinion offer 
examples of properties with similar access limitations that had 
been developed for those uses. In essence what the Owner 
is saying is that it is acceptable for it to express opinions that 
the property can not be developed without support therefore but 
DDOT should not be permitted to present evidence that it could be 
developed for those uses and support that testimony with actual 
instances where development has occurred. 
The Owner also presented extensive testimony and introduced 
into evidence an exhibit regarding a development scheme showing how 
the subject could be developed. [Tr. 171 - 175.] [Owner's Exhibit 
D-E.] This development plan had buildings, landscaping, parking 
lots and interior roads located on the subject property, none of 
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which existed. The scheme was only devised by the witness, 
Webster, the weekend before the beginning of the trial. It had not 
been submitted to the county for approval. [Tr. 182.] There was 
a canal and a creek running through the subject property. The 
proposed development did not take those features into account. 
[Tr. 216, 217.] The inconsistency of the Owner's position in 
submitting into evidence unapproved, last minute, and incomplete 
plans for the development of the subject property on the one hand 
and then objecting to the reference by UDOT's witness, Clinger, to 
interchange areas that had been developed on the other is glaring. 
Plaintiff submits the testimony of Mr. Clinger was 
appropriate and the court's rulings relating thereto were correct. 
2. The Examples Used by Mr. Clinger were to Demonstrate 
Developability and Were Not Offered as Comparable 
The examples used by the witness, Clinger, were for the 
purpose of evaluating accessibility to determine the developability 
of properties situated similarly to the subject. [Tr. 806, 807, 
812, 818.] Mr. Clinger in this regard stated: 
My comparison here is only for access-
ability. I am not attempting to compare 
value here, at all. For accessibility, 
they are quite similar. [Tr. 812.] 
Mr. Clinger testified regarding five developments on or 
near interchanges that had been developed for commercial-business 
type uses. The purpose was to show that investors have been 
willing to invest considerable resources to develop properties with 
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access restrictions similar to the subject. The Owner's witnesses 
testified that property with access control like that on 6200 South 
near the subject rendered it not "developable." [Tr. 86, 87, 467, 
471, 472, 477.] 
The Owner challenged the dinger testimony on the basis 
that the examples were not comparable sales. [Tr. 815.] The Owner 
misconstrued the purpose of the testimony. The testimony was 
offered in support of Mr. dinger's opinion regarding the 
property's "use" potential and not as comparable sales in support 
of his value conclusion. The testimony indicated that the subject 
property could be developed with the access restrictions for 
purposes which the Owner's witnesses testified it could not. Major 
commercial users such as K-Mart [Tr. 812; Ex. P-19.], Sizzler [Tr. 
816; Ex. P-20.], Village Inn [Tr. 817; Ex. P-21.], and Valley Fair 
Mall [Tr. 818; Ex. P-22.] have developed on properties with access 
restrictions similar to the subject. Mr. dinger had earlier 
submitted five comparable sales in support of his conclusions as to 
value. [Tr. 797 - 801.] 
One of the six interchange developments the Owner 
complained about was submitted by Mr. dinger as a comparable sale 
(Price Savers' Property.) It was property that had been sold and 
developed with access controlled frontage located on an interchange 
that indicated not only the developability of such property but 
also that there was no reduction in the sales price for such 
properties. [Tr. 800, 820, 821.] 
The Owner, in its brief incorrectly lists factors that it 
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characterizes as being things the witness "was unable to tell the 
court." [Appellants' Brief P. 11.] First, counsel for the Owner 
did not ask this witness for the information. On voir dire the 
only question he asked was whether or not dinger used a "sale 
transaction" for comparability. [Tr. 813, 815.] Clinger was not 
ask any questions relative to the issues listed on P. 11. The 
statement that the witness was "unable" to tell the court about 
those issues is incorrect. He simply was not asked about all of 
those factors. Second, the list of factors the Owner claimed the 
witness could not tell the Court about included access. The 
witness did discuss the access to the properties. dinger's 
testimony in this regard was: 
On U.S. 89 there is no access to the 
K-Mart store. You must turn on Shephard 
Lane, and drive down to the entry to the 
K-Mart store. [Tr. P. 812.] 
Similarly he testified about the access to the other 
properties he referred to. [Tr. 814, 820.] 
3. The Law is Well Settled that Factors Such as Those 
Considered by Mr. dinger Should be Considered in 
Appraising Prpp^rtieg. 
It is well established in Eminent Domain law that an 
expert appraisal witness should take into account those factors 
that a willing buyer and a willing seller would consider in making 
a transaction. This proposition is stated in Nichols on Eminent 
Domain as follows: 
All factors which would be considered 
by a reasonable purchaser and seller in 
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fixing value should be considered by the 
witness in reaching his opinion. 
Vol. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 23.07 [1] P. 23-
74. (Revised 3rd Edition, 1991.) 
It is certainly "reasonable" to conclude that both a buyer and a 
seller of an interchange property would be interested in how other 
sites with similar attributes have been developed. To adopt a 
-position that buyers and sellers would not consider such factors is 
unreasonable. 
The Utah Supreme Court has endorsed this approach. In 
Redevelopment Aa. of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui. Inv. Inc., 522 P.2d 
1370 (Utah 1974) the Court stated: 
It is true that the appraisers should 
take into account all facts and circumstances 
relating to the property which he thinks has 
a bearing on value: and that this may include 
any potential use or development which is to 
be expected with reasonable certainty. But 
the work of an appraiser, though it can be in 
a sense factual and scientific in some of its 
aspects is also an art, in that it reflects 
the creative talents, the experience, the 
integrity, and in sum, the personalized 
judgment of the individual appraiser. It 
is his prerogative to select and analyze 
the various factors which seem important 
to him in arriving at his estimate as to 
value. Therefore, no one should be able 
to put him in a straight-jacket as to his 
method; . . . 
Id. at 1373. [Emphasis added.] 
The Court of Appeals in Ohio stated this principle 
clearly as follows: 
All factors which would be considered 
by willing, able, fully informed buyers and 
sellers in fixing the value should be con-
sidered by the witness in reaching his 
opinion. . • . 
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To adopt a rule of law which closes the 
courtroom door to the appraiser with a keen 
ear for the things which move the markets up 
and down would make as much sense as to close 
the courtroom to doctors who cannot resurrect 
Louis Pasteur to first testify as to his 
original experiments. 
Mashiter v. C.H. Hooker Trucking Co., 250 N.E. 2d 
621, 622 (Ohio, 1969). 
UDOT submits that the reference by witness dinger to 
developments in the area of similarly situated properties was not 
only proper, but was what all of the appraisal witnesses should 
have done. One of the Owner's appraisal witnesses testified that 
factors such as those taken into account by Mr. Clinger are 
commonly considered by appraisers. Mr. Cook stated on direct 
examination: 
. . . The highest and best use of this 
property, I think, is basically determined by 
the probabilities of what could be done with 
this property. In other words, its location, 
its access features and some of the conditional 
uses listed under the zoning. The master plan 
that was taken into consideration. 
Not only that, but what other properties 
in similar locations under similar circum-
stances have been developed into. We also 
take into consideration competitive prop-
erties and what thev were developed into or 
planned to be developed into. I think all of 
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these things have to be taken into consider-
ation and really what the highest probable 
use must be analyzed and concluded. 
[Tr. 263.] (Emphasis added.) 
The properties that Mr. dinger surveyed fit exactly into 
the category indicated by Mr. Cook as being something an appraiser 
should consider in making his appraisal. 
4. The Cases Cited by the Owner in its Brief 
are not Contrary to UDOT's Position. 
The Owner has cited no case to support the position that 
dinger's testimony regarding developed interchange sites is 
inadmissible. The cases cited in its brief are distinguishable. 
In Carpet Barn v. State, by and through Dep't. of Transp. . 786 P.2d 
770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . 1) the testimony offered was not used as 
a basis for an appraisal witness expert testimony, 2) in the 
instant case testimony was presented that the access restrictions 
were similar to those of the subject property. Access conditions 
of both the subject and the developed properties were explained, 
and 3) the testimony offered was in rebuttal to testimony offered 
by the Owner. 
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Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS 
REGARDING HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS ASKED ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
1. Counsel for the Owner was Allowed to Ask 
Questions Covering All Points it Attempted 
to Cover Including Hypothetical Questions. 
Counsel for the Owner asked witness VanDrimmelen twice 
during cross examination to assume that the subject property was 
something different from what it was. VanDrimmelen was asked to 
assume that the north portion of the subject property had sold off 
"before the taking, from the south." [Tr. 720.] This not only 
called for an assumption of facts not in evidence but called for an 
assumption of facts contrary to the evidence. Counsel was given 
the opportunity to "rephrase the question." The question was asked 
again in basically the same way. [Tr. 721.] Counsel was allowed 
to ask questions about the Owner losing its flexibility to divide 
the subject into smaller pieces because of the taking. This 
examination was allowed. [Tr. 723.] 
Later, when counsel asked Mr. VanDrimmelen (not Mr. 
Clinger as indicated in Appellee's Brief, P. 13) to assume facts 
contrary to the evidence regarding access to the subject, an 
objection was sustained. However, when counsel asked the question 
in the true form of a hypothetical using hypothetical properties 
and not the subject he was allowed to pursue that questioning. 
[Tr. 761, 762.] The Owner was in fact allowed to cross examine 
using hypothetical questions that did not assume, by making 
reference to the subject property, facts that were contrary to the 
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evidence. This, UDOT submits, moots the issue relative to 
hypothetical questions. 
2. The Use of Hypothetical Questions is Discretionary, 
and the Trial Court Did Not Abuse That Discretion in 
Disallowing the Owner's Hypothetical Questions. 
Assuming arcruendo that the Owner is correct and it was 
not allowed to ask all of the hypothetical questions it wanted to, 
there still would have been no error committed by the trial court. 
The use of hypothetical questions is only allowed in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. The case of State v. Peek, 265 P.2d 
630 (Utah 1953), relied upon by the Owner, clearly states that it 
is discretionary. The court in the Peek case quoted from Nichols 
on Eminent Domain when it stated that "in the discretion of the 
court." a witness may be asked questions on cross examination not 
allowed on direct. Id. at 138 [Emphasis added.] In the Peek case 
the issue was whether or not a witness could be cross-examined 
regarding sales of property that were similar to the property being 
appraised. The court ruled that such examination was6correct. It 
referred to the Nichols citation in support of this principle. Id. 
at 637. The use of hypothetical questions generally, and 
particularly those assuming facts not in evidence, was not an issue 
in the Peek case. What is clear from the Nichols citation in the 
Peek case is that questions of this nature are discretionary with 
the court. 
3. Hypothetical Questions Should Not be Asked That 
Assume Facts That Are Contrary to the Evidence. 
The leading case in Utah dealing with the use of facts 
not in evidence as a basis for a hypothetical question during cross 
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examination is Nichols v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co.. 25 Utah 240, 
70 P. 996 (1902) . Contrary to the erroneous interpretation of this 
case by the Owner, the issue in Nichols was the use of assumed 
facts not in evidence in a hypothetical question asked during 
cross-examination. The Court stated in this regard: 
Upon cross-examination, plaintiff's 
counsel asked the witness the following 
question . • . [question and objection 
omitted]. We think this objection should 
have been sustained. The hypothetical 
question thus submitted assumed facts 
which indisputably had neither been 
proven, nor in truth existed. [Citation 
omitted.] It is a proposition too 
simple to require any citation of author-
ities that the material facts assumed in 
a hypothetical question must be proven on 
trial, or, rather, that there must be 
evidence on the trial tending to prove 
them; otherwise it is error to allow them 
to be answered. Icl. at 247 
The A.L.R. citation that is relevant to UD0T#s position 
on this issue is 71 A.L.R. 2d § 7(b) P. 6 wherein it states: 
In a number of jurisdictions it has 
been held that a hypothetical question 
asked on cross-examination of an expert 
may not properly assume facts not in 
evidence.5 Under this view it follows 
a fortiori that a hypothetical question 
may not assume facts contrary to the 
weight of the evidence. [Emphasis added.] 
One of the cases cited in footnote 5 of the above quote 
is the Nichols case. 56 A.L.R.3d § 6(b) 300 at 323 referred to by 
the Owner in its brief * is not contrary to this provision as the 
Owner suggests it is. It states that "although some courts have 
concluded . . . that hypothetical questions must only assume facts 
in evidence regardless of the nature of the examination being 
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conducted,w others have concluded otherwise. [Emphasis added.] 
Utah is obviously included within the category of "some courts" 
that do not allow such questions. The Owner's assertions in its 
brief both as to UDOT's lack of precedents and interpretation of 
those offered is incorrect. Courts in other jurisdictions have 
refused to allow the use of hypothetical questions in the cross-
examination of expert witnesses which assumed either facts not in 
evidence or facts contrary to the evidence. Barretto v. Akau. 463 
P.2d 917 (Haw. 1969); Peterson v. Schlottman. 392 P.2d 262 (Or. 
1964); Fluckey v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 838 F.2d 302 
(8th Cir. 1988). 
The question in reality is a tempest in a teapot in that 
counsel for the Owner was allowed to ask hypothetical questions so 
long as he did not ask the witness to assume facts relative to the 
subject property that were contrary to the evidence. 
IV 
THE TESTIMONY OF UDOT WITNESSES WAS IN 
ACCORD WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON 
ITS MOTION IN LIMINE AS TO THE DIAMOND 
INTERCHANGE DESIGN. 
The Owner's contention that UDOT witnesses "subverted and 
violated" the law of the case is absolutely and unequivocally 
wrong. It is shocking that such a claim would even be made. The 
testimony of all of the UDOT witnesses was based on the diamond 
interchange design that had been adopted by UDOT in 1973 and was 
the design used in the Bettilyon II case. A copy of that design 
was introduced into evidence by UDOT and used by all of its 
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witnesses in determining the before value of the subject property. 
[UDOT's Exhibits P-l, P-5.] There was no objection to these 
Exhibits, 
It is the Owner who now is trying to change the "law of 
the case" by trying to have facts added to the case that simply did 
not exist in the 1973 design. The Owner's own witnesses testified 
that the relocation of Cottonwood Canyon Road east of the 
interchange would interconnect with the existing road system. 
[Owner's Exhibit D-A, Attachment 1.] 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that were 
entered by the trial court after hearing DDOT's Motion in Limine 
provided: 
At the time Bettilyon II was filed 
by UDOT with this court, UDOT had committed 
to and final plans at that time were approved 
for the construction of the 1-215 freeway 
interchange as set out in the right-of-way 
maps and plans attached by UDOT to its 
condemnation complaint. [Tr. 199.] 
10. At the time Bettilyon II was filed 
in 1973, as well as the time of settlement in 
1980, UDOT did not have any plans, designs or 
proposals that would suggest any additional 
parts of the remaining Bettilyon property, now 
the subject of the February 8, 1988 filing in 
this case, would be necessary for the construction 
or realization of the 1-215 freeway and 6200 
South Street. [Tr. 200.] 
The Owner would now, apparently, change the facts of the 
case to include a road project for the relocation and/or widening 
of 6200 South (Cottonwood Canyon Road) east of the diamond 
interchange to be considered in the valuation of the property 
before the taking. If that contention were true, one must ask: 
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Where is the design for the road referred to in the record of this 
proceeding?; What was the alignment of this mythical road?; How 
much of the Owner's property would have been needed for the design 
of this expanded road?; Would the Owner have any frontage on it 
and, if so, how much?; What would the Owner do if that hypothetical 
road project included access restrictions?; and When would it have 
been designed? There is nothing in the record to support the 
Owner's position regarding this issue. 
The only design for the continuation of 6200 South 
(Cottonwood Canyon Road) to the east of the diamond interchange 
"area" is the design of the connector road (that road connecting 
Wasatch Boulevard with the urban interchange, part of the design 
for the after condition). That design is shown on the aerial 
photograph of the construction of the urban interchange which was 
received in evidence, without objection. [UDOT's Exhibit P-2, 
Attachment 3.] 
The Owner's witness DeMass prepared Exhibit D-A which 
depicted its position regarding the subject property in the before 
condition. His testimony when asked by counsel for the Owner was: 
Q. As of February, 1988, what was 
the then condition of the design 
of the freeway and frontage roads, 
non-access lines, and right-of-way 
lines, as you have shown them on 
Exhibit A? 
A. At that point in time, the Department 
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of Transportation was committed and 
dedicated to the plans that were complete 
at that particular time, which I have 
depicted on this exhibit. 
Q. How long had they, as of that time? 
A. I believe 1973, since 1973. 
[Tr. 77.] 
Exhibit D-A shows the road system as being the same as 
UDOT's witnesses assumed in their testimony. 
With regard to the road system in the before condition 
Mr. DeMass further testified: 
Q. Mr. DeMass, you analyzed the road 
conditions both before and after the 
taking, I assume, did you not? 
A. I did. 
Q. With regard to Big Cottonwood Canyon 
Road, that's a two-lane road facility 
prior to the construction of the facility 
in this case? 
A. That's correct. 
[Tr. 95.] 
Mr. DeMass' testimony was to the effect that the 
conditions surrounding the diamond interchange design (the before 
conditions) were all known. This would necessarily include such an 
important element as the roadway east of the interchange upon which 
the Owner's property abutted, and which it now claims would somehow 
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be changed in character from what it was at the time of the 1973 
diamond design. His testimony was as follows in answer to 
questions asked by counsel for the Owner: 
Q. There was also asked a question 
about whether you had done an actual 
traffic study and analysis in connection 
with your testimony and opinion in this 
case. Do you remember that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Did you think that was wrong? 
A. No. 
Q. To do an actual traffic analysis? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. It had already been done by the 
State in the design process of the 
first two designs. We were given a 
piece of property with all the knowns. 
We had access along the northwest side, 
we had access along the north side, 
along the east side. Those were 
knowns. The roadway was designed. 
. . . [Tr. 123.] [Emphasis added.] 
The accesses referred to were the frontage road designed 
under the diamond configuration and Cottonwood Canyon Road (6200 
South) and 3000 East. The first two designs were for the Bettilyon 
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I and Bettilyon II cases. There was no new design for those roads 
in 1973 either for widening them or realigning them that was put 
into evidence by any witness. Mr. Webster, one of the Owner's 
other witnesses testified that in the before scenario the road 
under the diamond interchange connected with the existing road 
system. [Tr. 202 - 205.] The position of the witnesses for the 
Owner was that access to the existing road system was vital to the 
development of the property. None of its witnesses testified to a 
"relocated" or "expanded" road system east and south of the diamond 
interchange in the before condition. 
The Owner has attempted to distort the testimony further 
by suggesting that UDOT's witnesses did not take into account the 
beneficial effects of the diamond interchange. (Appellant's Brief 
P. 35.) This comment is not true and is contrary to the evidence. 
Mr. VanDrimmelen in his testimony for UDOT said in his 
opinion the subject property before the taking would have been 
worth from $1.00 to $1.50 per square foot if the diamond 
interchange influence were not considered and $3.20 with the 
influence of the diamond interchange. His testimony of the value 
of the subject before the taking was $3.20 per square foot. [Tr. 
672, 710.] 
Mr. dinger, one of UDOT's witnesses in his testimony 
regarding the condition of the property before the taking said: 
. • . I have inspected this property. 
I know it to be a very good location. It is 
one of the final interchange locations that 
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will be available for development in this 
valley, on the manor freeway system, . . . 
It has access along an established roadway, 
that is good. It is going to be on the 
interstate freeway system. . . . The prop-
erty has suitable development slopes. It is 
not going to be a major problem to develop 
this land. 
Physically, it is well configured for 
a number of different types of use. Its 
frontage and access are good. So I see no 
problems in the general development portion 
of the property. . . . The property also 
has a frontage road that will run along the 
westerly side of the property. And being on 
the interchange, I feel this is a very good 
parcel of land, extremely well located, and 
a good development parcel. 
[Tr. 790.] [Emphasis added.] 
The problem the Owner is apparently having with UDOT's 
witnesses' testimony is that those witnesses said the subject was 
not only a good property before the taking with the diamond 
interchange design but also a good parcel of land after the 
construction of the urban interchange. It still retained its 
interchange location. The urban interchange provided for more 
efficient and smoother movement of traffic than the diamond. The 
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newly created controlled intersection at 3000 East and 6200 South 
provided needed traffic control. The fact that the existing road 
system east of the interchange had some deficiencies was only one 
of the factors considered, but was not a factor that restricted 
development or affected value. It is baffling to think that the 
Owner would contend that UDOT's witnesses could not or should not 
take all of the factors both before and after the taking and 
construction into consideration in evaluating the property. 
As indicated earlier, the 1973 diamond interchange design 
for 1-215 at the time of the filing of the Bettilyon II case 
provided the factual basis for the before value. As the Owner 
argued at the Motion in Limine the Owner was entitled to rely on 
that design in determining values. Section 78-34-10 U.C.A. 
provides: 
The court, jury or referee must hear 
such legal evidence as may be offered by 
any of the parties to the proceedings, and 
thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
(1) . . . 
(2) If the property sought to be 
condemned constitutes only a part of a 
larger parcel, the damages which will 
accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned 
and the construction of the improvement 
in the m$tnn$r pypppgefl fry %h$ plaintiff. 
(3) . . . 
(4) Separately, how much the portion 
not sought to be condemned . . . will be 
benefited, if at all, by the construction 
of the improvement as proposed by the 
plaintiff. . . . 
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[Emphasis added] 
The Bettilyon II case was tied to the design and 
construction "as proposed." Neither the diamond interchange design 
of 1973 nor its design anytime thereafter included relocation of or 
otherwise improvements to Big Cottonwood Canyon Road (6200 South) 
east of the interchange. [Exhibits P-l# P-5# D-A.] It was that 
design that was used as a basis for the testimony of all witnesses 
for the before conditions of the subject property. 
V 
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR MANDATING 
THE AWARD OF A NEW TRIAL EITHER ON ANY 
POINT RAISED BY THE OWNER OR CUMULATIVELY. 
THE VERDICT WAS WELL WITHIN THE RANGE OF 
THE TESTIMONY. 
UDOT submits that the Owner has failed to establish 
that the trial court committed error in its rulings on any of the 
points raised in its brief. If there were any irregularities at 
the trial, they were insignificant and not prejudicial. Most of 
the errors claimed by the Owner would only go to the weight of 
evidence not its admissibility. 
The major difference between the witnesses for UDOT and 
those of the Owner related to severance damages to the remaining 
property after the taking. The difference in values before the 
taking was relatively small: 
VanDrimmelen's before value was $3.20 per sq. ft. 
dinger's before value was $3.75 per sg. ft. 
Cook's before value was $3.90 per sq. ft. 
Brown's before value was $4.30 per sq. ft. 
There was a greater difference between Owner's witnesses 
Cook and Brown ($.40 per sq. ft.) than between UDOT's witness 
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dinger and Owner's witness Cook ($.15 per sq. ft.). The 
differences in testimony as to severance damage amounts were 
significant. They were: 
dinger $ 28,800.00 
VanDrimmelen 30,870.00 
Cook 1,189,147.00 
Brown 1,316,534.00 
The jury awarded $144,607.60 as severance damage. This 
award was well within the range of the testimony. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is "within the 
province of the jury to give such weight to the testimony of each 
of the experts as the jury thought it was entitled to and it was 
for the jury alone to decide what weight, if any, should be given 
to the testimony of any witness." State Road Commission v. 
Taaaart. 19 Utah 2d 247, 250, 430 P.2d 167 (1967). (Emphasis 
added.) With regard to the issue of the verdict being within the 
scope of the evidence relative to severance damages in a 
condemnation case the court in the Taacrart case said: 
. . . the finding of the jury in 
respect to the severance damage was 
within the range of the testimony upon 
that subject matter. We are of the 
opinion that there is a reasonable 
basis in the evidence for the finding 
of the jury in respect to damages and 
that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defendants motion 
for a new trial. . . . 
13. at 250. 
UDOT submits that there was ample support for the jury 
verdict in the instant case and its decisions regarding both land 
values and severance damages were well within the range of the 
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testimony. Where the verdict is within the range of the testimony 
the presumption supports it. The Utah Supreme Court has said in 
this regard: MA311 presumptions favor the verity of the verdict 
and judgment; and this includes all aspects of the conduct of the 
proceedings and rulings of the court.11 Redevelopment ACT, of Salt 
Lake C. v. Mitsui Inv. . Inc.. Supra at 1374. The trial court in 
the instant case neither committed reversible error during the 
trial nor abused its discretion in denying the Owner's Motion for 
new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties in this case had a fair opportunity to 
present their evidence to the jury. The jury returned a verdict 
well within the range of the credible evidence. The trial court 
did not commit any prejudicial or reversible error. The trial 
court had an opportunity to review the evidence and its rulings in 
acting on the Owner's Motion for New Trial. It denied the request. 
UDOT respectfully submits that the trial court's rulings during the 
trial and the hearing on the Motion for New Trial were correct and 
it urges this court to sustain the jury verdict and the rulings of 
the trial court. , 
DATED this y ^ day of November, 1992. 
DONALD S-T COLEMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellee 
40 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that four copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellee were mailed first class, postage prepaid, to 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Kevin Egan Anderson, Attorneys for 
Defendants and Appellants, One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor, 201 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 9th day of 
November, 1992. 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
Owner's Exhibit D-A 
Base Map of Subject Property Before the Taking 
Diamond Interchange Features Shown 
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ATTACHMENT 2 
UDOT's Exhibit P-1 
Aerial Photograph of Subject Before the Taking 
Diamond Interchange Features Superimposed in Color 

ATTACHMENT 3 
UDOT's Exhibit P-2 
Aerial Photograph of Subject After the Taking 
Urban Interchange Shown as Constructed 

